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Nomadic Territories: A Human
Rights Approach to Nomadic
Peoples’ Land Rights
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Abstract
In most societies nomadic peoples face discrimination. At the heart of
this discrimination frequently lies the crucial issue of property in land.
The sharing of lands between nomads and settled agriculturalist socie-
ties has often led to violent confrontation. Access to land is a determining
factor for many nomadic peoples as whether or not nomads have access
to land will determine the survival of their mobile lifestyle. Historically
nomadic peoples have not been regarded as having any rights to land
because their nomadic lifestyle was not considered to fulfil the criterion
of ‘effective occupation’of the land. By exploring the evolution of interna-
tional law regarding nomadic peoples’ land rights, this article analyses
how human rights law could provide nomadic peoples with rights to use
their lands. Ultimately, this article argues that under the banner of inter-
national human rights law, nomadic peoples are gaining the right to live
on their land in their traditional ways through the gradual establishment
of a specific corpus of law dedicated to the rights of nomads.
1. Introduction
I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and
superior races out of large tracts merely because they have acquired the
habit of straggling over far more land than they can utilize.
Sir Charles Eliot, Kenya Land Report, 19331
*Lecturer, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster (j.gilbert@ulster.ac.uk). The author
wishes to thank Prof. Koen de Feyter, Dr David Keane, Prof. Christine Bell and
Catherine O’Rourke for comments on an earlier draft of this work.
1 Kenya Land Commission Report (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1933) at 642.
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The wandering life is a life of freedom. There are no chains binding us
to the same place. New landscapes and new perspectives also liberate
the mind and thoughts.
Nils-Aslak Valkeapaa, Sami, Norway2
Since the dawn of mankind there has been a violent confrontation between two
lifestyles: the settled and the nomadic way of life.3 The battle between Cain, the
farmer, and Abel, the herder, is often viewed as an illustration of this violent
clash.4 The dichotomy between settled and nomadic populations is often at the
root of violent conflicts, and time and again at the heart of such confrontation is
the issue of the sharing of lands between nomadic and sedentary peoples. The
report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur highlighted that
the root cause of the conflict in the Darfur region is ‘the competition between
various tribes, particularly between sedentary tribes and nomadic tribes over
natural resources as a result of desertification.’5 Similarly, examining the geno-
cide that took place in Rwanda, one of the sources of the genocide can be traced
back to the distinction established during the colonial period between nomadic
Tutsis and agriculturalist Hutus.6 These examples are not isolated and there
has been a plethora of violent conflicts over land usage between nomadic and
non-nomadic societies throughout history.7 During colonisation nomadic
peoples were regarded by the colonial powers as even more ‘backward’ than
other so-called ‘savages’.8 Nomadism is still seen as a thing of the past which
should be abolished; consequently, the main legal approach to nomadism is
2 As quoted in Swift and Perry, Nomadic People Speak: Vanishing Footprints (Oxford: New
Internationalist Publication, 2001) at 123.
3 See Khazanov, Nomads and the OutsideWorld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
A nomadic way of life or nomadic lifestyle refers to a life organised around cyclical or
seasonal patterns.
4 The battle between Cain, the farmer (the ‘tiller of the ground’), and Abel, the nomad
(the ‘keeper of sheep’), saw the defeat of the nomad. See van den Brink et al., ‘The
Economics of Cain and Abel: Agro-Pastoral Property Rights in the Sahel’, (1995) 31 Journal
of Development Studies 373.
5 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2005,
25 January 2005 at para. 203 (see also paras 52^58). See also Markakis, Pastoralism on the
Margins (London: Minority Rights Group, 2004).
6 For an informed discussion, see Hintjens, ‘When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the
Genocide in Rwanda’, (2001) 1 Ethnicities 25. See also Lewis and Knight, The Twa of Rwanda
(Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1995).
7 See Khazanov, supra n. 3; and Beals, Nomads and Empire Builders (New York: Citadel Press,
1965).
8 See, for example, Vignon, Un programme de politique coloniale, les questions indige' nes
(Paris: Plon, 1919).
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based on the idea of integration within the majority settled society. This process
of forced ‘sedentarisation’ is often imposed upon nomads by force.9
Legally, nomadic peoples were often labelled as ‘criminal’ and seen as a
danger to society. For example, under British colonial rule in India, nomadic
tribes were ‘notified’as born criminals under an 1871 law based on their noma-
dic lifestyle.10 Words such as ‘vagabond’, ‘tramp’ or ‘wanderer’ are usually
attached to the notion of nomadism. For example, the ParliamentaryAssembly
of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration to make clear that the use of the
term ‘vagrants’ in Article 5(1)(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) does not necessarily apply to people with a nomadic lifestyle.11 This
resentment against nomadic peoples is reflected in international law, and
nomadic peoples are often those left behind by its development.Whereas there
is a large body of literature available from anthropological and sociological per-
spectives on specific use of nomadic lands,12 the legal literature remains quite
limited.13 This article aims to address this gap. While it examines the legal
theory regarding nomadic peoples’ land rights, it will maintain the necessary
multidisciplinary approach dictated by the subject by relying on anthropologi-
cal, sociological and political sources. Based on such an approach, this article
aims to evaluate the role of human rights law in ensuring nomadic peoples’
access to and use of their traditional transhumant territories.
The Oxford English Dictionary traces the origins of the word ‘nomad’ back
to the Greek nemein meaning ‘to pasture’, and defines a nomad as ‘a member of
a people continually moving to find fresh pasture for its animals and having
no permanent home’. One central aspect of this definition is the link between a
people on the move and the reason behind such movement, which is to find
fresh pasture. Anthropological research suggests that there are three main
9 For examples and references see Noyes, ‘Nomadic Landscapes and the Colonial Frontier:
The Problem of Nomadism in German SouthWest Africa’, in Russell (ed.), Colonial Frontiers,
Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2001) at 198.
10 Criminal Tribes Act 1871, this was replaced with the Habitual Offenders Act 1959. See
National Human Rights Commission of India, ‘Habitual Offenders Act to be Repealed:
NHRC Takes Up the Cause of the Denotified and Nomadic Tribes’, March 2000.
11 Paragraph xii, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1203 (1993) on
Gypsies in Europe, 2 February 1993, at para. xii. Article 5(1)(e), ECHR makes an exception
to the right to liberty and security of person for ‘the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or
drug addicts, or vagrants’.
12 See, for example, Ingold, Riches and Woodburn, Hunters and Gatherers, Volumes 1 and 2
(New York: Berg, 1991); and Lee and Daly, The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Hunters and
Gatherers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13 The existing literature usually addresses specific geographical areas of the globe but do not
address the rights of nomadic peoples in a universal way. See, for example, Barume, Etude
sur le cadre le¤ gal pour la protection des droits des peuples indige' nes et tribaux au Cameroun
(Geneva: Organisation Internationale du Travail, 2005); and Osherenko, ‘Indigenous Rights
in Russia: Is Title to Land Essential for Cultural Survival?’, (2001) 13 Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review 695.
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categories of nomadic peoples: pastoral nomads, nomadic hunter-gatherers
and peripatetic service nomads.14 These categories encompass various
nomadic groups from fully nomadic hunter-gatherer communities to semi-
nomadic15 communities such as Roma/Gypsies or Irish Travellers, who, even
though not hunter-gatherers, are culturally regarded as nomadic peoples.16
The thread that links these different forms of nomadism is the idea of move-
ment from one place to another without the existence of a fixed or permanent
territory. For many nomadic peoples the possibility of travelling through their
traditional territories is central to their survival; the right to access such terri-
tory is therefore crucial. At the heart of the issue of territorial entitlement is
the fundamental question of whether nomadic peoples have the right to
remain nomads or whether they should settle down.
This article examines the territorial entitlements of nomadic peoples under
international law through three different lenses. The first part of the article
goes back to the roots of the rules of international law regarding title to ter-
ritory and examines their impact on nomadic peoples’ land rights. Based on
this assessment the article then analyses the extent to which international
law remains embedded within a sedentarist approach to territory which
rejects nomadic territorial entitlements, and whether the international
human rights framework will ultimately make a positive difference for noma-
dic peoples. In order to address this issue, the second part of the article
examines recent developments in human rights law regarding the rights of
indigenous peoples as there is a movement towards linking nomadic peoples’
land claims to the rights of indigenous peoples.17 The article critically exam-
ines the extent to which such development is relevant to nomadic peoples’
land rights, with a particular focus on the development of a discourse on
collective land rights. Finally, the third part of this article analyses whether
human rights law offers, or should offer, specific rights to nomadic peoples to
use and access their traditional territories. This part of the article scrutinises
the potential development of a body of law targeted at securing rights that
are particular to nomadic peoples’ use of their traditional spatial territories
and offers a comprehensive outline of the main characteristics of such a
legal regime.
14 See Bogue, ‘Apology for Nomadology’, (2004) 6 Interventions 169; and Berland and Salo,
‘Peripatetic Communities: An Introduction’, (1986) 21/22 Nomadic Peoples 1.
15 Semi-nomadic peoples are peoples who move seasonally but have permanent homes for part
of the year. See, for example, Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation
(2004)14, 1 December 2004, which refers to semi-nomadic peoples as peoples who set up
their winter residence for a maximum period of six months and then move on.
16 See Liegeois and Gheorghe, Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority (London: Minority Rights
Group, 1995).
17 See Schweitzer et al. (eds), Hunters and Gatherers in the ModernWorld: Conflict, Resistance, and
Self-Determination (NewYork: Berghahn Books, 2000).
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2. Strangers in their Own Lands: Nomadic Peoples as
‘Ine¡ective’ Occupiers of their Territories
An obvious difficulty for nomadic peoples when asserting territorial rights is
that they wander from place to place and occupy areas for a limited period of
time. Thus, nomadic peoples are not regarded as legal occupiers of any particu-
lar land as they do not to have ‘a fixed abode, and definite territory belonging to
the people by whom it is occupied’.18 The rules governing territorial ownership
emerged from aWestern theory that land has to be ‘properly’ used and occupied
to provide title of ownership. However, historically, nomadic communities have
not been regarded as sufficiently ‘civilised’ to possess rights over their territories
as the nomadic system of land use was seen as an outdated and non-rational
organisation of land utilisation.
A. Cain and Abel’s Ghosts: Nomadism versus the ‘Agricultural Argument’
From its origins the rules governing land use and ownership have been framed
around the principle of ‘effective occupation’ of the land. From Locke to Hegel,
several major authors have argued for what can be described as the ‘cultivation
test’or ‘agricultural argument’.19 The ‘agricultural argument’ promotes the view
that only cultivation of land can be regarded as a‘proper’occupation of land, and
only agriculture can be regarded as a basis of a real land tenure system. In his
Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, Locke
introduced the view that uncultivated land was not possessed closely enough to
constitute property.20 For example, while‘Indians’ had some usufructuary rights
over their hunting products, they were‘commonly without any fixed property in
the ground.’21 For this reason, territories used by hunters and gatherers or non-
sedentary agriculturists were to be regarded as vacant. The Lockean argument
that rights in land arose only from appropriation and improvement of the land
by agriculture was widely accepted.22 Rousseau explained the origin of
private property by using the model of the development of agriculture.23
18 Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) at 18.
19 Flanagan, ‘The Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands and
Political Philosophy’, (1989) 22 Canadian Journal of Political Science 589. See also Bassett,
‘The Myth of the Nomad in Property Law’, (1986) 4 Journal of Law and Religion 133.
20 See Locke,TwoTreatises of Government (London: Dent, 1924).
21 Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) at 72.
22 See Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970).
23 Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine de l’ine¤ galite¤ (Paris: 10/18, 1963). Similarly, in Rousseau,
Du contrat social (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), he wrote: ‘Pour autoriser un droit de
premie' re occupation, il faut qu’on en prenne possession non par une vaine ce¤ re¤ monie, mais
par le travail et la culture’ [to authorise a right to first occupation, you have to take posses-
sion not through formal ceremony, but through work and cultivation (Author’s translation)].
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Similarly, Kant saw the origins of statehood in the conflict between agricultur-
ists and nomads and argued for the establishment of a proper agricultural
society as the only way towards perpetual peace. In referring to aboriginal
societies in America, Kant described the social organisation of nomadic peoples
as lawless societies based on hunting, fishing and herding which of ‘all forms
of life . . . is without doubt most contrary to a civilized constitution.’24 Kant saw
the establishment of commerce and agriculture as the only way to bring
peace to these ‘uncivilised’ places and the only path for humanity to achieve
moral progress.
Overall, the crux of the ‘agricultural argument’ developed by the different
philosophers and political scientists of the 18th century was that settlement
and cultivation was the only basis for title to property. Thus, as nomadic groups
did not improve the soil by cultivating it, ‘they did not assert exclusivity; there-
fore, . . . their rights were so negligibly thin as to disintegrate automatically
wherever the European invader set literal or constructive foot.’25 The principal
rationale behind such an argument was that nomadic peoples were regarded
to be in a sort of pre-political state of nature with no proper laws and institutions
dealing with property in land. Despite some nomadic communities having
extremely elaborate systems of property rights,26 political scientists and lawyers
have usually failed to recognise such systems either by ignorance or by
arrogance. Only a system based on settled agriculture was seen as giving rise
to a recognised system of property in land.
This ‘agricultural argument’ had a deep impact on the development of
international law. Vattel, who is considered one of the fathers of international
law, stated that ‘the cultivation of the soil . . . is . . . an obligation imposed upon
man by nature.’27 Consequently, he affirmed that non-agricultural societies
‘can not populate the whole country’ as their occupancy cannot be ‘a real and
lawful taking of possession.’28 Therefore, it was entirely lawful to occupy such
a country.29 In relation to the colonisation of North America,Vattel wrote that
Indian tribes:
can not take to themselves more land than they have need of or can
inhabit and cultivate. Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions
can not be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the
24 Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983)
at 122.
25 Bell, ‘Forum on R. Marshall: Was Amerindian Dispossession Lawful? The Response of 19th
Century Maritime Intellectuals’, (2000) 23 Dalhousie Law Journal 168 at 179.
26 Ingold et al., Hunters and Gatherers: Property, Power and Ideology,Volume 2, supra n. 12.
27 Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle (1758), reprinted asThe Law of Nations or
the Principles of Natural Law (Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1916) at 37.
28 Ibid. at 85.
29 See Fitzpatrick, ‘Terminal Legality: Imperialism and the (de)Composition of Law’, in Kirkby
and Coleborne (eds), Law, History, Colonialism,The Reach of Empire (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2001) 14.
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Nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon lands
which the savages have no special need of and are making no present
and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them and
establish colonies in them.30
Vattel’s idea of the superiority of settled agricultural societies was a reflection of
the general literature of this period.31 These 18th century theories fostered the
idea that land ownership could only be based on the definite occupancy of such
land and that agriculture was the only means to define the terms of occupation.
The agricultural argument had a crucial impact on nomadic peoples’ rights
within the Law of Nations; it justified the colonisation of non-agricultural
lands, and carried the idea that a community cannot be considered as sovereign
if such a community is not composed of settled inhabitants with a so-called
‘proper’ land tenure system. The agricultural argument implied that sovereign
nation-states can only be defined on the basis of a definite territory, a require-
ment which excludes nomadic tribes from the sphere of international law.
As Lawrence stated in1895: ‘even if we suppose a nomadic tribe to have attained
the requisite degree of civilization its lack of territorial organization would be
amply sufficient to exclude it from the pale of International Law.’32
Similarly, at the national level, the rules governing land tenure usually
reflected the idea that nomadic peoples were not ‘properly’ using the land.33
Indeed, Burke has pointed out that the common law principle of adverse posses-
sion is also deeply embedded in theWestern notion that occupation of the land is
synonymous with the efficient use of the land: ‘one justification for this doctrine
is that it promotes the efficient use of land through punishment for non-use.’34
This approachwas based on the idea that nomadic peoples might exist, but that,
based on their ‘inferiority’and their non-rational uses of the lands, settlers have a
right to own their lands.This theory prevailed in North America. For example, in
the case of Johnson v M’Intosh of1823 the US Supreme Court stated:
The character and religion of [the New World’s] inhabitants afforded an
apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior
genius of Europe might claim ascendancy. To leave them in possession
of their country was to leave the country a wilderness . . . .
Agriculturalists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on
30 Vattel, supra n. 27 at 85.
31 One of the only exceptions being Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum (1764)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1934), who held that single families and nomadic tribes had a right
to the land they inhabited.
32 Lawrence,The Principles of International Law (London: MacMillan and Co., 1914) at 59.
33 See, for example, Goguet, De l’origine des lois, des arts, et des sciences, et leur progre' s chez les
anciens peuples (Paris: Chez Desaint and Saillant, 1758).
34 Burke, ‘Let Out in the Cold: The Problem with Aboriginal Title under Section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 for Historically Nomadic Aboriginal Peoples’, (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 1 at 29, n. 80.
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abstract principles, to expel hunters from their territory . . .. Excuse,
if not justification, [could be found] in the character and habits of the
people whose rights had been wrested from them . . . . The potentates of
the Old World . . .made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the
new, by bestowing upon them civilization and Christianity.35
As a result of this theory of ‘effective occupation’ of lands, nomadic peoples
have been regarded as legally non-existent. They were perceived as not being
‘civilised’ enough to have a right to occupy their lands. In relation to the rules
governing title to territory the ‘agricultural argument’ resulted in the belief that
territories inhabited by nomadic peoples were empty and open to conquest or
discovery.
B. ‘Vacant’ Territories: Nomadism as aTerra Nullius
Under international law states can occupy any empty territory. This rule
comes from the Roman law principle of terra nullius, meaning that any
uninhabited territory is open to conquest and can be occupied by states.36
This principle has been extensively used by colonial powers in relation to
nomadic peoples’ territories, which were regarded as belonging to no one
and open to colonisation. The ‘agricultural argument’ coupled with the con-
cept of terra nullius meant that the use and occupation of territories by
nomadic peoples had no standing, did not need to be respected and could
not constitute a source for ownership or use of the land. It was only in
1975, in the Western Sahara case,37 that the relationship of nomadic peoples
to their territories was recognised in international law. In this case, the UN
General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advi-
sory opinion on the territorial dispute between Mauritania and Morocco
regarding the status of the Western Sahara. One of the central issues for
the ICJ was whether at the time of colonisation by Spain the Western
Sahara was terra nullius. In exploring which of the two states (Mauritania
or Morocco) had title to the territory, the ICJ considered whether the noma-
dic tribes that lived in the concerned area at the time of colonisation were to
be regarded as occupiers of their lands or whether the territory was to be
regarded as empty. The ICJ found that:
the nomadism of the great majority of the peoples of Western Sahara at
the time of its colonization gave rise to certain ties of a legal
character . . .. The tribes, in their migrations, had grazing pastures,
35 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 U.S. 543 at 573^90.
36 For a comprehensive overview of terra nullius, see Bedjaoui,Terra nullius, ‘droits’ historiques et
autode¤ termination (The Hague: Sijthoff, 1975).
37 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 12.
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cultivated lands, and wells or water-holes in both territories, and their
burial grounds in one or other territory. These basic elements of
nomads’ way of life . . .were in some measure the subject of tribal
rights, and their use was in general regulated by customs.38
The ICJ advised that nomadic tribes should be ‘considered as having in the
relevant period possessed rights, including some rights relating to the lands
through which they migrated.’39 The ICJ added that territories inhabited by
nomadic peoples living as ‘organised societies’ were not to be considered
empty nor open to state acquisition on the basis of occupation. In doing so,
the ICJ rejected the application of an approach based on terra nullius by
recognising that nomadic tribes had legal ties with their territories.
Nevertheless, while the ICJ recognised these legal ties, the Court did not
acknowledge that the nomadic peoples living in the Western Sahara had a
legitimate claim to the territory. Instead, addressing the General Assembly’s
question, the ICJ tried to establish to which state the nomadic tribes had
allegiance, so as to determine which state would exercise control over the
territory of the Western Sahara. Even though this judgment can be seen as
an important step towards the legal recognition of nomadic peoples’ territor-
ial entitlements, the ICJ did not consider nomadic peoples as potential
owners of their territories. The Advisory Opinion can certainly be regarded
as a crucial turning point in the relationship between nomadic societies and
the rules governing title to territory as it recognised that nomadic peoples
legally existed. However, the ICJ’s opinion also highlighted that under inter-
national law nomadic societies are not to be regarded as exercising an effec-
tive occupation of their territories as only states could. Because this criteria
of effective occupation is central to a claim to territorial sovereignty, interna-
tional law seems to have no way of coping with nomadic peoples. The rules
governing title to territory remain expressed within rigid territorial struc-
tures which do not consider a nomadic lifestyle as an effective mode of
territorial possession.
The legal recognition of the existence of nomadic peoples and their ties to
their traditional lands was echoed at the national level in a very significant deci-
sion of the High Court of Australia: Mabo v Queensland (No. 2).40 This decision is
significant bothwithin Australia and internationally as Australiawitnessed one
of the most blatant applications of the terra nullius doctrine. During the process
of colonisation of the continent, nomadic Aboriginal peoples were considered as
having no legal rights and so their territories were subsequently perceived as
‘empty’ and open to colonisation.41 It was only in 1992 that the application of
38 Ibid. at para. 152.
39 Ibid.
40 (1992) 107 ALR 1.
41 See Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996).
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the fiction of ‘empty land’ (terra nullius) was recognised as discriminatory and
racist in essence.42 In the Mabo case, the Australian High Court relied on inter-
national law to reject the application of terra nullius in Australia, stating:
If the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified as
terra nullius no longer commands general support, the doctrines of
common law which depend on the notion that native peoples may be
‘so low in the scale of social organization’ that ‘it is idle to impute to
such people some shadow of the rights known to our law’ can hardly be
retained.43
This quotation from the judgment of the High Court of Australia illustrates the
crucial importance of the aforementioned ICJAdvisory Opinion that rejected the
application of terra nullius to nomadic peoples. However, as pointed out above,
despite this rejection of terra nullius the judgment did not open the right for
nomadic peoples to claim territorial sovereignty; it merely recognised them as
peoples capable of holding legal title to land.
The case between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou strip before the ICJ is also
enlightening inunderstanding the international legal approach to nomadic peo-
ples’ rights over their own territory.44 In this case, Libya argued its title to the
disputed territory based on its interaction with the Senoussi tribe, a nomadic
group living on the disputed territory between Chad and Libya. However,
the tribe had not been consulted. In a similar approach to the one adopted
in the Western Sahara case, the parties referred to the nomadic tribes that
live on the concerned territory only to provide evidence of their effective control
over the territory.Thus, in this territorial dispute nomadic peoples were not con-
sidered to have any rights over their own territory.45
This position was reaffirmed in other international cases, including, for
example, the case between Eritrea and Yemen before the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. That Court held:
There can be no doubt that the concept of historic title has special
resonance in situations that may exist even in the contemporary world,
such as determining the sovereignty over nomadic lands occupied
during time immemorial by given tribes who owed their allegiance
to the ruler who extended his socio-political power over that geographic
area.46
42 Hill, ‘Blackfellas and Whitefellas: Aboriginal Land Rights, The Mabo Decision, and the
Meaning of Land’, (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 303.
43 Mabo, supra n. 42 at para. 41.
44 Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad), ICJ Reports 1994, 6.
45 On this issue, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sette-Camara, ibid.
46 Eritrea vYemen (1998) 114 ILR 1 at para. 123.
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This arbitral decision highlights the extent to which international law fails to
consider the attachment of nomadic peoples to their territories as constituting a
basis for title to territory.47
The different cases illustrate that despite the rejection of an unmitigated
application of terra nullius to territories inhabited by nomadic peoples, inter-
national law still does not regard nomadic peoples as legal occupiers of their
territories. This failure to recognise nomadic peoples as potential ‘effective
occupiers’ of their lands is based on the diffuse but persistent belief that
because nomadic peoples are continuously moving from place to place they
do not really occupy the lands. The view that nomadic peoples and hunter-
gatherers are not attached to any particular place has developed despite the
work of modern anthropologists which proves how nomadic peoples have
developed spiritual ties, and social and spatial boundaries to specific terri-
tories.48 While Deleuze and Guattari observe that no nomadic population
wanders aimlessly and randomly,49 a key obstacle to recognition of title to
territory lies in the fact that different sub-tribal groups often use the same
territory in different ways and for different purposes. Yet, as Deleuze and
Guattari also point out, the sharing of territories between nomadic groups
and other groups (settled or nomadic) is done on the basis of very organised
agreements; they refer to such sharing of territories as ‘negotiated space’
or ‘distributional spaces’.50 Evidence from both sociological and anthropologi-
cal studies proves that for generations nomadic peoples have developed very
strong ties with their territories, which are usually designated grazing, fish-
ing or hunting areas.51 International law fails to recognise these ties as proof
of effective occupation of territory. Only states can exercise a form of collec-
tive territorial ownership under their right to territorial sovereignty. In con-
trast, nomadic peoples are not recognised as effective occupiers; although one
possible exception is that of nomadic peoples forming a state of their own.52
47 For an analysis of the decision see Reisman, ‘The Government of the State of Eritrea and the
Government of the Republic of Yeman. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of
the Proceedings. (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute)’, (1999) 93 American
Journal of International Law 668.
48 See, for example, Casimir and Rao (eds), Mobility and Territoriality (NewYork: Berg, 1992).
49 Deleuze and Guattari, Mille Plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980) at 609.
50 Ibid. at 10.
51 For references, see generally Casimir and Rao, supra n. 48.
52 There is no state with a nomadic structure. The closest example is the case of the Western
Sahara. In the past, Mongolia was often regarded as a ‘nomadic’ empire; however the con-
temporary status of the state does not make any specific recognition of nomadism. See
Humphrey and Sneath, The End of Nomadism Society? Society, State and the Environment in
Inner Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Allsen, ‘Sharing Out the Empire:
Apportioned Lands Under the Mongols’, in Khazanov and Wink (eds), Nomads in the
Sedentary World (London: Curzon, 2001) 172; and Mearns, ‘Community, Collective Action
and Common Grazing: The Case of Post-Socialist Mongolia’, (1996) 32 Journal of
Development Studies 297.
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And as Jennings and Watts have highlighted: ‘A wandering tribe, although it
has a government and is otherwise organised, is a not a state until it has
settled down in a territory of its own.’53 In other words, nomadic peoples
cannot exercise territorial sovereignty nor can they claim status as a state.
Public international law, and more particularly the rules governing title to
territory, does not recognise any territorial rights for nomadic peoples,
remaining constant in its approach that only a settled state can exercise ter-
ritorial sovereignty. The criterion of statehood requiring that a state have a
defined territory has not yet been read as possibly including the nomadic
use of such territory, and nomadic peoples must fit into the structure of a
state in which the majority is settled. As there are very few places in the
world that have a predominately nomadic population that could potentially
claim statehood and challenge the present understanding of territorial sover-
eignty,54 nomadic peoples must look beyond the rules governing title to terri-
tory to find ways that would allow them to claim rights over their traditional
transient territories. Such an avenue has been developed for nomadic peoples
under the banner of indigenous peoples’ rights, under which international
law has started to acknowledge that cultural ties to territory could be the
source of rights over territories for indigenous peoples.
3. Nomadic Peoples as Indigenous Peoples:
Collective Land Rights
Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law have witnessed major devel-
opments in recent years.55 One of the cornerstones of indigenous peoples’ rights
is their right to use and/or own their traditional territories and, consequently,
recent legal developments in indigenous peoples’ rights could be used to support
nomadic peoples’ legal claims over their territories. Indeed, nomadic peoples
have often resorted to the international mechanisms offered to indigenous peo-
ples at the United Nations; for example, every year, several nomadic peoples’
representatives attended the UNWorking Group on Indigenous Populations.
A crucial issue when addressing the rights of nomadic peoples is their
status under international law.Within international law there is no accepted
legal definition of indigenous peoples. There are, however, three key legal
53 Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume I, 9th edn (London: Longman,
1992) at 563^4.
54 See Castellino, ‘Territory and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-
Determination in theWestern Sahara’, (1999) 28 Journal of International Studies 523.
55 See Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2002) and Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
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definitions from the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
and theWorld Bank which are often referred to.56 The first definition outlined by
the UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo is often accepted as authoritative. He
defined indigenous peoples as follows:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of
them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.57
The second definition is taken from the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples. Article1(1) defines indigenous peoples as:
. . . peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and eco-
nomic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their
own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; . . . peoples
in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of
conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state bound-
aries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.58
TheWorld Bank has adopted its own policy on indigenous peoples, which does
not formally define the term‘indigenous peoples’ but refers to groups with a dis-
tinct cultural and social background possessing the following characteristics in
varying degrees:
(i) self-identification as members of a distinct indigenous cultural group and
recognition of this identity by others;
(ii) collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral terri-
tories in the project area and to the natural resources in these habitats and
territories;
56 For example, see Makkonen, Identity, Difference and Otherness, The Concepts of ‘Peoples’,
‘Indigenous People’ and ‘Minority’ in International Law (Helsinki: Erik Castren Institute of
International Law and Human Rights, 2000).
57 Martinez-Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 at para. 379.
58 Article 1(1), Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989, 1650 UNTS 383.
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(iii) customary cultural, economic, social, or political institutions that are sepa-
rate from those of the dominant society and culture; and
(iv) an indigenous language, often different from the official language of the
country or region.59
Even though each is slightly different, these three definitions have certain
common elements. They all offer a mix of objective’ criteria, such as historical
continuity, and ‘subjective’ ones, most commonly self-definition. In particular,
three features are shared byall the definitions: (i) indigenous peoples are descen-
dants of the original inhabitants of territories since colonised by foreigners
(‘having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies’);
(ii) they have distinct cultures, which set them apart from the dominant society;
and (iii) they have a strong sense of self-identity. Nomadic peoples could fulfil
these criteria; they often have preceded the creation of the state in which they
live and could be considered ‘first peoples’60 and they have a close attachment to
their ancestral territories through their commitment to a transhumant pastor-
alist culture and identity. The three definitions also highlight that indigenous
peoples are communities who live in a non-dominant situation. Similarly, noma-
dic peoples often live marginalised from the dominant political and economic
systems as a result of their non-agricultural economic base and traditional cul-
tural identity. Thus, with reference to these criteria, the situation of nomadic
peoples could correspond to the definition of indigenous peoples under interna-
tional law and it is possible to refer to ‘nomadic indigenous peoples’.
The recognition of nomadic peoples as indigenous peoples could have
profound significance in relation to the recognition of their territorial rights.
Under international law indigenous peoples have a specific right to a collective
and customary form of land ownership and this could encompass a nomadic
approach to land ownership and usage.
A. Nomadic Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Collective Land Usage and Ownership
Many states do not acknowledge the right of nomadic peoples to exercise their
traditional use of land. Most national legal systems do not recognise collective
forms of land ownership and usage and several states have put in place policies
transferring land from common grazing to private individual ownership.
For example, during the three sub-regional seminars on ‘Multiculturalism in
Africa’ organised by the United Nations, a major issue was the relationship
59 World Bank, ‘Operational Policy and Bank Procedures on Indigenous Peoples’, 10 May 2005,
OP/BP 4.10.
60 However, see the debates regarding the Roma/Gypsies originating in northern India and
now living in other continents: Henrard, ‘The Building Blocks for an Emerging Regime
for the Protection of a Controversial Case of Cultural Diversity: The Roma’, (2003) 10
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 183.
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between pastoral peoples and agriculturalists. Participants pointed out that the
key issue in this relationship was the very specific conception of individual
versus collective control over land and natural resources.61 Similarly, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Working Group of Experts
on Indigenous Populations/Communities has noted that ‘the favouring of settled
agriculture over hunting, gathering and nomadic cattle herding has been
instrumental in both marginalizing and stigmatising some peoples and inspir-
ing them to identify themselves as indigenous groups.’62 Byclaiming their rights
as indigenous peoples, nomadic peoples can assert their right to have their tradi-
tional forms of landholding recognised. In doing so, nomadic peoples can claim
their right to maintain their nomadic lifestyle and their specific attachment to
their territories as being part of their traditional way of life. A right for nomadic
peoples to maintain their traditional nomadic way of life is crucial to modelling
their cultural and property rights.
Regarding the right of indigenous peoples over their traditional territories,
the only specific internationally binding legal instrument is ILO Convention No.
169.This convention is also the only international human rights-oriented treaty
which specifically addresses the situation of nomadic peoples. In particular,
Article14 on land ownership provides that ‘particular attention shall be paid to
the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators’.63 The specific focus on
the situation of nomadic indigenous peoples is the result of a long series of
debates and discussion within the ILO. Indeed, it is worth noting that the ILO
Convention No.107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations1957 (ILO Convention
No.107),64 which was the predecessor to ILO Convention No.169, does not speci-
fically mention the situation of nomadic peoples. ILO Recommendation 104
concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries,65 which was adopted
as a supplement to ILO Convention No. 107, mentions the specific situation
61 See Report of the Seminar on Multiculturalism in Africa: Peaceful and Constructive Group
Accomodation in Situations Involving Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Arusha, United
Republic of Tanzania, 13^15 May 2000, 18 May 2000, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/WP.3; Report
on the Second Workshop on Multiculturalism in Africa: Peaceful and Constructive Group
Accommodation in Situations Involving Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Kidal,
Mali, 8^13 January 2001, 2 April 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/3; and Report on the Third
Workshop on Multiculturalism in Africa: Peaceful and Constructive Group Accommodation
in Situations Involving Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Gabarone, 18^22 February 2002,
17 June 2002, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2002/4.
62 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/
Communities, 14 May 2003 at 92.
63 Article 14, ILO Convention No. 169.
64 ILO Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other
Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 1328 UNTS 247. This
Convention is no longer open for ratification but it is still in force for 18 states.
65 ILO Recommendation 104 concerning the protection and integration of indigenous and
other tribal and semi-tribal populations in independent countries, 5 June 1957. The term
‘semi-tribal’ refers to ‘persons who, although they are in the process of losing their tribal
characteristics, are not yet integrated into the national community’.
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of nomadic peoples. However, the approach taken in the recommendation was
still deep-rooted within the integrationist approach of the late1950s:
(1) The population concerned should be assured of a land reserve adequate for
the needs of shifting cultivation so long as no better system of cultivation can be
introduced.
(2) Pending the attainment of the objectives of a settlement policy for semi-nomadic,
zones should be established withinwhich livestock of such groups can graze
without hindrance.66
The specific reference to nomadic peoples in ILO Convention No.169 came as
an answer to criticisms of the integrationist objectives of ILO Convention No.107
and of ILO Recommendation104.67 The first draft of the revised ILO Convention
No. 107 did not mention nomadic peoples.68 However, the Meeting of Experts,
which was in charge of drafting the new convention, noted the need to address
the specific situation of nomadic peoples; a position based on the recognition
that in many states national policies had been adopted to settle nomadic indi-
genous peoples.69 The Experts highlighted that ‘if programmes to settle indigen-
ous and tribal peoples occur in situations where competing claims are being
made to their traditional lands by outside colonists or developers, there is
danger that these peoples may be compelled to change their lifestyles and lose
effective access to their traditional lands.’70 This approach opened the door to
further consideration of the position of nomadic peoples in the drafting of ILO
Convention No. 169 and there was a strong focus on the specific situation of
nomadic peoples as regard their right to use their traditional territories during
the drafting debates.71The text that was finally adopted provides:
The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over
the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addi-
tion, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right
of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them,
but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and
traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation
of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.72
66 [emphasis added].
67 See Barsh, ‘Revision of ILO Convention No. 107’, (1987) 81 American Journal of International
Law 756.
68 International Labour Conference, Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), 75th Session, Report IV (1), 1987 at 9.
69 Ibid. at 65^6.
70 Ibid.
71 International Labour Conference, Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), 76th Session, Report IV (2B), 1989 at 14.
72 Article 14, ILO Convention No. 169.
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Article 14 makes a clear distinction between peoples that traditionally
occupied lands and consequently have a right of ownership, and peoples who
are using lands that are not exclusively occupied by them that have a right to
use the land. It seems clear that nomadic peoples, who are seen as sharing
land, would have a right to use rather than own lands.73 This right for nomadic
peoples to use lands is a welcome development within international law, and
in this regard ILO Convention No. 169 stands as the leading treaty on the issue;
the only limit to its benefit being that to date only 19 states have ratified the
convention.74
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 196675 (ICCPR) also
provides protection for indigenous peoples’ land rights. It is a significant instru-
ment in nomadic peoples’ quest toward territorial rights as it is a much more
widely ratified instrument than ILO Convention No. 169. Article 27 which pro-
tects minority rights has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) to extend to protecting indigenous peoples’ specific relationship with
their territories. In its General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 the HRC stated:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms,
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to
live in reserves protected by law.76
The reference to ‘a particular way of life associated with the use of land
resources’ makes Article 27 especially relevant to the situation of nomadic
peoples as it embraces the right for nomadic peoples to exercise their specific
use of natural resources. From this perspective, Article 27 must be understood
as protecting the right for nomadic peoples to maintain their traditional lifestyle
and use of natural resources. Relying on this approach, the HRC has developed
a significant jurisprudence based on Article 27 of the ICCPR.77
An important aspect of this jurisprudence relates to the adaptation of noma-
dic peoples’ way of life to modern technologies. For example, one of the crucial
73 For a discussion on this issue, see, for example: ILO-ITP Project, ‘Strengthening the
Participation of Pastoralists and Hunter-Gatherers in the Kenya Constitution Review
Process’, November 2001, available at: www.ilo.org.
74 These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador,
Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Spain and
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
75 999 UNTS 171.
76 Para. 7, General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 158;
1^3 IHRR 1 (1994).
77 See Scheinin, ‘The Right to Enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and Competing Uses of
Land’, in Orlin et al. (eds), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights: A Comparative Interpretive
Approach (Turku: —bo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, 2000) at 159.
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issues for the HRCwas to determine whether the adoption of modern techniques
for reindeer herding activities could still qualify as a traditional form of land
usage. This issue is central to the evolution of the HRC’s approach to nomadic
peoples’ land rights as the protection of their right to use the land is encom-
passed within the right of indigenous peoples to exercise a traditional cultural
way of life which is different from the main society in which they live. The key
determination to be made is what constitutes traditional use of a territory; in
many cases nomadic peoples have adapted their lifestyle to modern technology
(for example, nomadic or semi-nomadic Inuits hunters of the Arctic are using
helicopters for hunting and herding activities). This cultural approach to land
rights for nomadic peoples has been tested numerous times through the indivi-
dual complaints mechanisms of the HRC, which has received several individual
complaints from Sami nomadic peoples.78 In Sara v Finland the respondent state
argued that the reindeer breeders of Sami origin were not entitled to the protec-
tion of Article 27 as they were using modern technology such as snow scooters
and modern slaughterhouses and that the ‘concept of culture in the sense of
Article 27 provides for a certain degree of protection of traditional means of live-
lihood’ to which the authors of the complaints were not entitled as they were
using modern technology.79 On this issue the HRC stated:
While Finnish Sami have not been able to maintain all traditional
methods of reindeer herding, their practice still is a distinct Sami
form of reindeer herding, carried out in community with other mem-
bers of the group and under circumstances prescribed by the natural
habitat. Snow scooters have not destroyed this form of nomadic reindeer
herding.80
In this case, the fact that Finnish Sami were using snow scooters did not prevent
them from claiming their right to use their lands in a traditional nomadic way,
and thus to be entitled to the protection of their right to maintain such a lifestyle
underArticle 27 of the ICCPR.
This case is not isolated and the HRC has re-affirmed that nomadic peoples
may adjust to modern life without losing their cultural rights in other cases.81
Overall, Article 27 of the ICCPR offers protection to nomadic peoples under the
banner of minority rights, and in particular, the right to enjoy their culture.
78 See La« nsman et al. v Finland (511/1992), CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994); 2 IHRR 287 (1995);
La« nsman et al. v Finland (671/1995), CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1996); 4 IHRR 405 (1997); and
Kitok v Sweden (197/1985), CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988).
79 Sara et al. v Finland (431/1990), CCPR/C/50/D/431/1990 (1994); 1^3 IHRR 14 (1993)
at para. 6.4.
80 Ibid. at para. 7.4.
81 La« nsman et al. v Finland (511/1992), supra n.78; Kitok v Sweden, supra n.78; and Lubicon Lake
Band v Canada (167/1984), CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990).
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Of particular relevance to nomadic peoples is the fact that ‘culture’mayconsist of
a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of its resources.
This reference to a way of life closely associated with territory is crucial.
For example, in the case of Diergaardt v Namibia, the HRC rejected the claim for
Article 27 protection from a pastoralist community that had only a limited his-
torical connection with their territory, stressing that such protection only
applies to communities that can prove that their way of life is historically asso-
ciated with their territories.82 Clearly, Article 27 will cover nomadic peoples’
right to land to the extent that they can prove a historical cultural attachment
to their lands.
The most pertinent jurisprudence related to the rights of nomadic indigenous
peoples over their territories comes from the Inter-American system of human
rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) has
observed that land rights for indigenous peoples are essential for their survival
as they represent a necessary way of providing them with the resources that
sustain life and ‘the geographic space necessary for the cultural and social
reproduction of the group’.83
In its 2001 landmark decision in the case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v Nicaragua,84 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) affirmed the right of the indigenous community to collective owner-
ship of their lands and natural resources. Important consequences for nomadic
peoples flow from this judgment particularlyas it was pointed out that ‘one of the
grounds of the State for denying possession rights to the territory has been to
argue that these communities are nomadic.’85 The crucial issue for the IACtHR
was that the indigenous community’s relationship with their territories was
based on a collective approach to ownership and sharing. As Stavenhagen, one
of the expert witnesses, stated during the trial:
In lowlands, indigenous peoples have traditionally practiced shifting
subsistence agriculture, especially in tropical forests. They often com-
bine this shifting subsistence agriculture with other activities which
require an economic space relatively larger than the specifically agri-
cultural plot. The space in which the indigenous population moves,
sometimes almost as semi-nomadic groups, is a collective space.86
82 Diergaardt et al. v Namibia (760/1997), CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000); 8 IHRR 46 (2001) at
para. 10.6.
83 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, 24 April 1997, Ser.L/V/II.96.Doc.10
Rev 1 at 115.
84 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua IACtHR Series C 79 (2001); 10 IHRR
758 (2003). See Pasqualucci, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American
Human Rights System’, (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 281.
85 Testimony of Galio Enrique Gurdia¤ n Gurdia¤ nm reproduced in the judgment, ibid.
86 Ibid. at para. 83d.
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It is through this prism of a right to a ‘collective space’ that the IACtHR recog-
nised that the nomadic community had a right to the collective ownership and
use of their traditional territories. The IACtHR stated:
Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regard-
ing a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that
ownership of the land is not centred on an individual but rather on the
group and its community. Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very
existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close
ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and under-
stood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life,
their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous commu-
nities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and
production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations.87
The IACtHR added that the respondent state should take into consideration
indigenous peoples’ customary law when recognising indigenous peoples’
rights over their traditional territories. Thus, states must recognise property
rights to land and natural resources based on traditional patterns of use and
occupation of ancestral territory by indigenous peoples and nomadic peoples’
traditional use of a territory should be regarded as a source of title to territory.
It is important to underline that in its decision the IACtHR relied on ‘an evolu-
tionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human
rights’discerning that under the current international regime of human rights
protection there is an evolution towards such recognition.This is significant and
highlights that the evolution towards a right to property which includes tradi-
tional forms of indigenous ownership is not limited to theAmericas but is part of
a universal advancement in human rights law.This is confirmed by recent devel-
opments at the national level regarding the rights of nomadic indigenous peoples
through the development of a theory of native or aboriginal title.
B. Aboriginal and NativeTitleTheories and Nomadic Peoples
There has been some important progress at the national level regarding the right
of indigenous peoples to exercise collective ownership over their traditional ter-
ritories through the development of the theory of ‘aboriginal’ or ‘native’ title.88
Developed by national courts, this theory recognises indigenous peoples’ land
rights as rights existing through indigenous customary laws which pre-date
87 Ibid. at para. 149.
88 ‘Aboriginal’ title is the terminology used in Canada whereas Australian jurisdictions refer to
‘native’ title. See McNeil, Common LawAboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
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national legal systems.89 Even though the theory was developed mainly through
Canadian and Australian jurisprudence,90 its use has gradually become more
international and several common law courts have referred to it when dealing
with indigenous peoples’ land rights.91 Under the theory of aboriginal or native
title, national courts have recognised that indigenous peoples do have rights
over their territories which are based on their traditional customary systems of
land usage. For nomadic peoples the development of such theory represents a
positive step as it means the legal recognition of both their traditional custom-
ary laws on land usage and their itinerant way of life.
In exploring the common law application of the criteria for occupation to
nomadic peoples, McNeil has arrived at the conclusion that ‘there can be little
doubt that a group of hunter-gatherers who habitually and exclusively ranged
over a definite tract of land, visiting religious sites and exploring natural
resources in accordance with their own interest and way of life, would have
been in occupation of that land.’92 As he points out, modern anthropological
research has revealed that nomadic groups are not indiscriminate wanderers
but are attached and bound to a specific territory. Thus, in relation to the rights
of nomadic groups over their territories, McNeil argues:
the extent of their occupation, . . .would include not just land in actual use
by them at any given moment, but all land within their habitual range,
for occupation, once acquired, is not necessarily lost by temporaryabsence,
so long as the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control and return
to the land continue, and no one occupies it in the meantime.93
One of the difficulties of applying aboriginal or native title theory to the situa-
tion of nomadic peoples is that an important criterion for proving the existence
of a right of an indigenous community to its lands is to prove that they occupy
89 See, for example, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), Delgamuukw v British
Columbia (1997) 3 SCR 1010; and Dick, ‘Comprehending ‘‘the genius of the common law’’ -
Native Title in Australia and Canada Compared Post-Delgamuukw’, (1999) 5 Australian
Journal of Human Rights 1.
90 See, for example, from Canada: Calder vAttorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR
(3d) 145; Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Others (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513;
R vAdams (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 657 (SCC); R vVan der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289 (SCC);
and Delgamuukw and Others v British Columbia, ibid.; and from Australia: Mabo and Others,
supra n. 40; and Members of theYortaYorta Aboriginal Community vVictoria [2002] HCA 58;
214 CLR 422.
91 For examples, see the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in
Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Limited and the Government of the Republic of
South Africa, Case No. 488/2001, 24 March 2003; and the decision of the Federal Court of
Malaysia in Adong bin Kuwau v Kerajaan Negeri Johor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, [1998] 2 MLJ 158. See
also Gilbert, ‘Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims: A Comparative and International
Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title’, (2007) 56 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 583; and Bennett and Powell, ‘Aboriginal Title in South Africa
Revisited’, (1999) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 449.
92 McNeil, supra n. 88 at 202.
93 Ibid. at 204.
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the land in an exclusive manner.94 This could prove problematic in the case of
nomadic peoples who usually share the land with other groups. However, the
Assembly of First Nations in Canada has highlighted that ‘exclusivity does not
refer to the absence of other groups on the land, but rather ‘‘the intention and
capacity to retain exclusive control’’’.95 Similarly, the jurisprudence of national
courts demonstrates that the criteria of exclusivity should not be seenas limiting
access to indigenous title for nomadic groups. In the Richtersveld Community
case, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa pointed out that ‘a nomadic
lifestyle is not inconsistent with the exclusive and effective right of occupation of
land by indigenous peoples.’96 The South African court added that even though
the concerned indigenous community need ‘not have occupied every bit of the
subject land, and even if other indigenous peoples sometimes visited the terri-
tory, their exclusive beneficial occupation of the entire area was not affected.’97
Thus, nomadic peoples would not have to be the sole occupier of a land to prove
their ties to their territory.
Nomadic groups must prove that they have exercised sufficient ties to the land
to claim a right over it. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the Delgamuukv case,
has affirmed that proof of physical occupation could be established in a number
of different ways such as construction of dwellings, hunting traps, etc.98 In the
case of nomadic peoples the relevant criteriawould be the regular use of wells or
defined tracts of land for hunting or fishing. However, Burke has highlighted
how the judgments from the Supreme Court of Canada have excluded some his-
torically nomadic groups from the protection offered under section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act 1982 (which recognises and affirms the rights of aboriginal
peoples of Canada).99 He points out that a close reading of the Delgamuukv deci-
sion, and in particular, the comments of Larmer CJC that:
Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of
connection with the land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to
make out a claim to title, but will nevertheless possess . . . site-specific
rights to engage in particular activities. . . .The fact that aboriginal
peoples were non-sedentary, however . . .does not alter the fact that
nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land prior to contact
with Europeans and, further, that many of the practices, customs and
traditions of nomadic peoples that took place on the land were integral
to their distinctive cultures100
94 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, supra n. 89 at para. 143.
95 Assembly of the First Nations, ‘The Amicus Curiae Brief of the Assembly of First Nations’,
(2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly at 580.
96 Richtersveld Community and Others, supra n. 91 at para. 23.
97 Ibid. at para. 24.
98 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, supra n. 89 at para. 149.
99 Burke, supra n. 34.
100 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, supra n. 89 at para. 139.
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suggest that seasonally-nomadic aboriginals ‘may be unable to make out a claim
toAboriginal title’.101
As the application of such strict criteria would reject seasonally nomadic
aboriginals, Burke proposes an approach based on the ‘bundle of rights theory’
under which ‘if an Aboriginal group can prove a sufficient number of site-
specific rights upon a reasonably circumscribed parcel of land, the group will
be able to claim Aboriginal title over at least some of that land.’102 Following
such an approach, nomadic communities may be able prove their rights to their
traditional territories by providing evidence of a sufficient number of site-
specific rights. Thus, if a group is able to prove its attachment to a specific
territory through different site-specific rights, this group would then prove its
attachment to such territory, and thus gain recognition of its aboriginal title.
However, this approach was rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court in the
2005 cases of Marshall and Bernard.103 The Court set out a very high threshold
of proof for aboriginal title and this may rule out any possibility of nomadic
communities claiming title to their traditional lands.104 Thus, while Canadian
courts have generally become more willing to receive indigenous peoples’
own proof of occupation of the land,105 this evolution seems to be limited
when it comes to nomadic communities. Although the development of a
legal theory on aboriginal or native title has some significant implications
for indigenous peoples, its relevance for nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples has
yet to be demonstrated.
Overall, under the banner of indigenous peoples’ rights, nomadic peoples
have gained some recognition of their rights to land. However, there are some
serious limitations to such an evolution. First, the rights of indigenous peoples
under international law are still underdeveloped, with ILO Convention
No. 169 being the only specific binding instrument concerning indigenous
peoples. Second, there are still some debates regarding the definition of indigen-
ous peoples and it seems that several nomadic communities would not qualify
as ‘indigenous’.106 Furthermore, as the reference to indigenous peoples’ rights
101 Burke, supra n. 34 at 26.
102 Ibid. at 31.
103 R v Marshall; R v Bernard (SCC) [2005] 2 SCR 220, (2005) SCC 43.
104 See the comments of LeBel J in R v Marshall, ibid. at para. 126: ‘nomadic life might have
given rise to specific rights exercised at specific places or within identifiable territories, but
never to a connection with the land itself in the absence of evidence of intensive and
regular use of the land.’
105 See Borrows, ‘Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Tradition’, (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 1; and Cooter and Fikentscher, ‘Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in
American Indian Tribal Courts’, (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 509.
106 For example, nomadic or semi-nomadic Roma communities would not qualify as indigen-
ous. See Henrard, ‘The Building Blocks for an Emerging Regime for the Protection of a
Controversial Case of Cultural Diversity: The Roma’, (2004) 10 International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights 183.
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remains a controversial issue in several African and Asian countries, a designa-
tion as indigenous might not be beneficial to nomadic peoples in these
regions.107 Third, the gradual recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights at
the national level has not produced a suitable framework for nomadic peoples,
as a higher threshold of fixed territorial attachment must be proven for nomadic
communities to benefit. Fourth, and most importantly, the present body of law
regarding indigenous peoples does not seem to address the particular situation
of nomadic peoples.
Current debates at the international level on the eventual adoption of an
international declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples have omitted the
specific situation of nomadic peoples’ land rights. The text of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not provide any specific
protection for nomadic peoples’ land rights.108 The next part of the article
explores to what extent there is a need for a legal approach which recognises
specific rights for nomadic peoples.
4. Special Rights for Nomadic Peoples:Towards
a ‘Nomadic Lex Specialis’?
Avariety of factors, including environmental concerns, development, control of
migration and restrictions to freedom of movement, are increasingly putting
pressure on nomadic lifestyles. The next part of this article argues that to
respond to these threats, there needs to be a legal arsenal that would allow
nomadic peoples to perpetuate their specific nomadic use of the land. There are
two sets of specific rights relevant to nomadic peoples: first, rights that are acces-
sories to the nomadic way of life (such as hunting or gathering rights), and
second, rights that relate to an enlarged approach to freedom of movement
encompassing a nomadic way of life. The first set of rights are usufructuary
rights attached to land and the rights to specific mobile services, whereas free-
dom of movement refers to rights such as the right to cross borders or to have
access to halting sites.
107 See Kingsbury, ‘Indigenous Peoples in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the
Asian Controversy’, (1998) 29 American Journal of International Law 414; and Hitchcock,
‘Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples in Africa and Asia’, in Forsythe and McMahon
(eds), Human Rights and Diversity: Area Studies Revisited (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2002) at 205.
108 The text of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the
Human Rights Council on 29 June 2006, A/HRC/1/L.10, and by the UN General Assembly
on13 September 2007, GA/10612. See Gilbert,‘Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, (2007) 14 International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights 207.
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A. BetweenTradition and Modernity: Protecting Usufructuary Nomadic
Rights and Providing Nomadic Services
Often nomadic peoples continually move fromone place to another because they
live in harsh environments.109 Environmental pressures have led to the develop-
ment of particular nomadic systems of survival, which rely on the specific use of
natural resources. Based on their particular way of life, nomadic peoples have
specific needs. Rights to hunt or graze could be, and often are, essential to survi-
val. However, there is often a clash between states and nomadic peoples on this
issue. The current trend of economic globalisation is giving rise to an increased
need for primary natural resources and this has often had a direct impact on the
lives of nomadic communities that dwell in territories rich in natural wealth.
The control over natural resources and their exploitation is a significant area of
on-going conflict between states, nomadic peoples and other private actors such
transnational corporations. In this quest for natural resources, the nomadic way
of life is regularly presented as destroying the natural environment.110 In very
dry parts of Africa especially, pastoralists are viewed as the main agents of soil
erosion and desertificationçconsequences of over-grazing and deforestation.
Berger, in her research on the situation of pastoralist nomadic peoples’ use of
lands in Kenya, has argued that ‘[g]overnments and scientists have long
regarded the pastoralists’ way of life as a cause of environmental degradation.
This belief is rooted in a misunderstanding of the pastoralist way of life and is
reflected in national policies on land tenure and resource access in Kenya.’111
Overall, and as pointed out by Campbell, in Africa, nomadic peoples’ pastoralist
access to lands has been ‘undermined by ‘‘scientific’’ rangeland conservation
policies that rely on the‘‘tragedyof the commons’’ thesis inwhich‘‘commonprop-
erty rights’’ in land and natural resources are incorrectly linked to overgrazing
and environmental degradation.’112 Such false claims have had a tragic impact
on nomadic peoples’ lives: by invoking the idea that nomadic peoples are making
the ‘wrong’usage of lands, states and other agencies have tried to force nomadic
peoples into a sedentarised way of life.113 Unfortunately, this trend is not limited
109 On this issue, see generally Casimir and Rao, supra n. 48.
110 Bjrklund, ‘Sa¤ mi Reindeer Pastoralism as Indigenous Resource Management System in
Northern Norway: A Contribution to the Common Property Debate’, (1990) 21 Development
and Change 75.
111 Berger, ‘Conflict Over Natural Resources Among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya: A Look at
Recent Initiatives in Conflict Resolution’, (2003) 15 Journal of International Development
at 246.
112 Campbell, ‘Ethnic Minorities and Development’, (2004) 4 Ethnicities 5 at 12.
113 The African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/
Communities reported that ‘many African governments have tended to apply development
paradigms focusing on assimilationist approaches designed to turn indigenous peoples into
sedenterized crop cultivating farmers on the assumption that the ways of life of indigenous
peoples have to change because they are ‘primitive’, ‘backward’, ‘unproductive’and degrading
to the environment.’ See Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on
Indigenous Populations/Communities, 22 April 2005.
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to Africa and across the world states, as well as international developmental
agencies, have put in place policies of ‘development’ for nomadic peoples based
on a so-called more rational use of the land, and forcing them to turn to agricul-
ture.Thus, as Hitchcock noted in the case of the San in Southern Africa, a major
concern of nomadic communities is ‘whether or not they will be able tomaintain
their rights to hunting and gathering in the face of major changes in land and
natural resource conservation legislation and development projects that tend to
favour mining, agriculture, and commercial livestock production.’114 This is why
nomadic peoples’ continued rights to hunt, fish and gather on their territories
are vital rights to be protected.
A central component of nomadic peoples’ property rights are usufructuary
rights to land. For nomadic peoples these include rights to hunt, fish, graze and
gather. These rights are at the core of many nomadic cultures which rely on
hunting or gathering activities for their livelihoods. Around the world, many
nomadic groups are witnessing an obfuscation of their usufructuary rights. As
highlighted above, fishing or hunting is often seen as destructive of the natural
environment. However, limitations on the rights of nomadic communities to per-
petuate activities such as hunting are not new. Early in the development of a
legal relationship between colonisers and aboriginal peoples in North America,
the right to hunt was a contentious issue. The Royal Proclamation of1763 which
formalised the legal framework of the relationship between aboriginal peoples
and the Crown in British North America paid specific attention to hunting
rights. The Proclamation stated:
It is just and reasonable and essential to our Interest, and the Security
of our Colonies, that several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whomWe
are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be
molested or disturbed in the Possession of such parts of Our
Dominions or Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us, are reserved to them, as their Hunting grounds.115
Similarly the treaties that were signed between the Dominions of Canada and
several aboriginal nations often focused on the recognition of hunting rights for
aboriginal peoples.116 The rights proclaimed in treaties signed in the18th or19th
centuries have had a considerable impact on the rights of first nations today.117
114 Hitchcock, ‘‘‘Hunting is Our Heritage’’, The Struggle for Hunting and Gathering Rights
among the San of Southern Africa’, Paper presented at the 8th International Conference
on Hunting and Gathering Societies, October 1998, Osaka, Japan.
115 The Royal Proclamation, reprinted in Kennedy (ed.), Documents of the Canadian Constitution,
1759^1915 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1918) at 20.
116 For example, see Treaty 3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the
Ojibbeway Indians 1873, which provides: ‘Her Majesty further agrees with her said Indians,
that they, the said Indians, shall have the right to pursue their avocations of hunting and
fishing throughout the tract surrendered.’
117 See Miller, ‘Native Rights: Indians Hunting and Fishing Rights’, (1991) 21 Environmental
Law 1291.
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In terms of contemporary international law, hunting, fishing and gathering
rights are part of the larger body of rights of minorities to exercise their own
culture. It is mainly through the recent development of the rights of indigenous
peoples over their traditional territories that international lawhas addressed the
right for nomadic peoples to perpetuate usufructuary rights such as hunting or
fishing. For example, ILO Convention No. 169 provides that the ‘traditional
activities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, trapping and gath-
ering, shall be recognised as important factors in the maintenance of their cul-
tures and in their economic self-reliance and development.’118 As mentioned
earlier, the HRC in its General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR pointed
out: ‘Culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous
peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting
and the right to live in reserves protected by law.’119 As a result of such a broad
approach to cultural rights for minorities, the HRC has developed a position
which pays specific attention to the rights of nomadic or semi-nomadic groups
to exercise their right to hunt or fish. For example, in its 2000 Concluding
Observations to Australia, the HRC affirmed that the continuation and sustain-
ability of traditional forms of economy for indigenous minorities such as hunt-
ing, fishing and gathering should be ‘a major factor in determining land use’.120
A similar approach regarding nomadic groups’ right to exercise their hunting
rights has been developed through the individual complaint mechanism of the
HRC. In the case of the Lubicon Lake Band,121the members of the aboriginal com-
munity whowere the authors of the complaint argued that their nomadic wayof
life had been significantlyaltered by recent developments concerning the exploi-
tation of oil in their territories which were destroying their traditional hunting
and trapping territory. The HRC recognised that ‘the rights protected by article
27, include the right of persons, in community with others, to engage in eco-
nomic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community to
which they belong.’122 Furthermore, the HRC explicitly recognised that
‘historical inequities, to which the State party refers, and certain more recent
developments, threaten the way of life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band,
and constitute a violation of Article 27 so long as they continue.’123 Thus, even
though the concerned community was no longer living a nomadic lifestyle,
the HRC took into consideration past restrictions to the hunting rights of the
community as part of an ‘ongoing violation’ of their rights under Article 27
of the ICCPR. In broader terms, this decision highlights that the HRC has
118 Article 23(1), ILO Convention No. 169.
119 Human Rights Committee, supra n. 76 at para. 7.
120 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Australia, 24 July 2000, A/55/40
at paras 498^528.
121 Lubicon Lake Band, supra n. 81
122 Ibid. at para. 32.2.
123 Ibid. at para. 33.
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adopted an approach to cultural rights which includes a right to hunt for noma-
dic communities when such a right is seen as part of their traditional cultural
patterns.124
The HRC is not the only UN treaty monitoring body that has paid specific
attention to usufructuary rights of nomadic peoples. The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has commented on the rights to hunt and
fish for Sami peoples in its 2001recommendations to Sweden, and expressed its
concern ‘over the issue of land rights of the Sami people, in particular hunting
and fishing rights which are threatened by, inter alia, the privatization of tradi-
tional Sami lands’.125
At the regional level, the IACommHR has also addressed the issue of hunting
rights. In the case of Mary and Carrie Dann v United States,126 the Danns and
other members of the Western Shoshone nation alleged that they had been
obstructed in carrying out their traditional subsistence hunting by state officials
who refused to accommodate traditional Western Shoshone hunting practices.
The petitioners claimed that ‘[s]tate officials have sought out and arrested mem-
bers of theWestern Shoshone people including members of the Dann band who
do not comply with the state hunting laws and regulations.’127 The IACommHR
pointed out that under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man there is a duty to take ‘special measures to ensure recognition of the parti-
cular and collective interest that indigenous people have in the occupation and
use of their traditional lands and resources and their right not to be deprived of
this interest except with fully informed consent, under conditions of equality,
and with fair compensation’.128
The development of a specific approach towards nomadic peoples’ usufruc-
turay rights is not limited to human rights bodies. The World Bank has also
paid attention to these rights. The World Bank’s Operational Directive on
Involuntary Resettlement, which sets out requirements to minimise the effects
of resettlement caused by development projects financed by the World Bank,
mentions the situation of nomadic peoples and specifically protects ‘pastoralists
whomay have usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken
for the project.’129
In conclusion, it seems that gradually human rights treaty bodies, regional
human rights bodies and development agencies such as the World Bank
are recognising the need to recognise specific usufructuary rights of nomadic
124 See also the HRC’s decision in see Jonassen et al. v Norway (942/2000), CCPR/C/76/D/881/
1999 (2002); 10 IHRR 323 (2003), which examines grazing rights.
125 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
Sweden, 1 May 2001, CERD/C/304/Add.103 at para. 13.
126 Case 11.140, Mary and Carrie Dann v United States Report No. 75/02 (2002); 10 IHRR 1143
(2003).
127 Ibid. at para. 41.
128 Ibid. at para. 131.
129 World Bank Operational Manual, ‘Involuntary Resettlement’, June 1990, OD 4.30.
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peoples.Yet, the development of a body of law which protects the usufructuary
rights of nomadic peoples is still in its infancy, as there are no specific interna-
tional human rights instruments which address these rights. As highlighted
earlier there is a clear need for states and development agencies to recognise
usufructuary rights and for human rights treaty bodies to continue to pay spe-
cific attention to the fragile and ancestral right of nomadic peoples to maintain
their traditional use of their lands through the perpetuation of their usufructu-
ary rights.
B. Freedom of Movement: Cross Border Rights and Ensuring Halting Facilities
Nomadism is about moving freely. It seems logical, therefore, that a central way
to protect an eventual right to nomadism would come under the banner of a
right to freedom of movement. Two issues particularly affect nomadic peoples’
freedom of movement. First, the ability to move freely across the borders of dif-
ferent states; and second, the right to a halting site, or a right to encampment.
In recent years, many nomadic peoples have been restricted in their
cross-border movements. By definition nomadic peoples are peoples on the
move or mobile peoples. This free movement runs contrary to the will of states
to control the movement of peoples across borders. The establishment of modern
national boundaries with strong border surveillance often limits nomadism.
As Krakover has stated: ‘the demarcation of boundaries and the creations of
states put a heavy strain on the nomad way of life’.130 Such a clash is not only a
contemporary issue: since European colonisers have established borders all
over the world this has created difficulties for nomadic peoples whose traditional
wayof life finds themselves crossing the borders of different countries. AsMenon
has noted:
Nomadic peoples principally engaged in hunting and watching over
their grazing flocks had little, if any, conception of a boundary as
definite line of demarcation. Only with the development of agriculture
and a settled population did the idea of proprietary rights in land, and
consequently the need for precise boundary line rather than broad
intervening zones, begin to develop.131
Furthermore, the anthropologist Brody has highlighted that frontiers were
celebrated for the opportunities they offered to settlers and adventurers,
130 Krakover, ‘Urban Settlement Program and Land Dispute Resolution: The State of Israel
Versus the Negev Bedouin’, (1999) 47 GeoJournal 551.
131 Menon, ‘International Boundaries ^ A Case Study of the Guyana-Surinam Boundary’, (1978)
27 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 738 at 740. However, he notes that there
were a few exceptions, for example, the Boro people of the west Amazon, the Maidu of
California and the Vedda of Ceylon.
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whilst the nomads knew no borders; they used to freely cross regions that are
nowadays caught between different national borders.132 Despite the historical
disregard for nomadic peoples’movement across borders, there have been a few
exceptions where the issue of cross border rights for nomads has been a central
issue in the establishment of borders. For example, when the Norwegian^
Swedish border was defined by the Stromstad Treaty of 1751, specific attention
was given to the rights to cross the borders for the nomadic tribes living on either
side of the border. An addendum to the Stromstad Treaty, also known as ‘the
Lapp Kodicill’, recognised the right of the Sami to freely cross the border as part
of their seasonal migration of reindeer herding:
The Sami need the land of both states. Therefore, they shall, in accor-
dance with tradition, be permitted both in autumn and spring to move
their reindeer herds across the border into the other state. And here-
after, as before, they shall, like the state’s own subjects, be allowed to
use land and share for themselves and their animals, except in the
places stated below, and they shall be met with friendliness, protected
and aided.133
Likewise, Annex 3 of the 1897 treaty between Britain and Ethiopia, regarding
control over the Ogaden region along the Ethiopian^Somali border, reserved
grazing rights for nomadic tribes across the border.134 More recently, Article 9
of the Convention of Good Neighbourliness 1955, between France and Libya,
recognised the rights for nomadic tribes to freely cross borders: ‘The
Government of France and the Government of Libya undertake to grant freedom
of movement to nomads from tribes that traditionally trade on either side of the
frontier’.135 These treaties highlight that the possibility for nomadic peoples to
cross borders allowing them to perpetuate their ancestral migration movement
has been a recognised privilege.
The entitlement to cross borders remains a contemporary issue for nomadic
peoples who live between different countries. ILO Recommendation 104
addresses the situation of indigenous nomadic communities who live in frontier
zones and recommends that governments take ‘intergovernmental action . . .by
means of agreements between the governments concerned, to protect semi-
nomadic tribal groups whose traditional territories lie across international
boundaries’and to ensure members of these groups receive fair wages for work
132 See Brody, The Other Side of Eden, Hunter-Gatherers, Farmers and the Shaping of the World
(London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 2001).
133 As quoted in Sillanpa« a« , Impact of International Law on Indigenous Rights in Northern Europe
(Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1992) at 6.
134 East, ‘Ethiopia-Somalia’, in Day (ed.), Border and Territorial Disputes, 2nd edn (Harlow:
Longman, 1987) at 114^6.
135 As quoted by the International Court of Justice in Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad),
supra n. 44 at para. 53. For the historical background to this treaty, see Dadi, ‘Me¤ moire
du Gouvernement de la Re¤ publique du Tchad, Chapitre III’, ibid.
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done and are not subject to discrimination.136 However, despite these indications
of a specific entitlement to cross-border rights for nomadic peoples, such a right
remains extremely limited under international law, particularly with the drive
towards restricting cross-border movement. This issue is not well addressed
under international law and deserves more attention. The development of a spe-
cific right for nomadic peoples to travel across national borders during seasonal
migrations is crucial for their survival. After all, a boundary is ‘the imaginary
line which divides two pieces of land from one another’,137 and international
law should acknowledge that for nomadic peoples there should be a special
right to cross these imaginary lines.
As stated earlier, a second aspect of freedom of movement for nomadic peo-
ples relates to their right to use halting sites. Often the movement of nomadic
peoples is restricted by rules prohibiting them from halting and setting up
camp. Europe, particularly, has seen an increasing tendency to restrict the pos-
sibility for nomadic or semi-nomadic groups such as the Travellers138 or the
Roma to do so.139 Accordingly, one of the most developed legal theories relating
to halting or transient sites comes from Europe.The Council of Europe especially
has paid attention to the situation of Roma, Sinti,Travellers and Gypsy commu-
nities.140 What has been pushed forward in terms of their right to land is the
right for nomadic and semi-nomadic communities to have access to halting
sites, and, under the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, a right to
respect for their home.141
Other institutions of the Council of Europe have also adopted resolutions and
recommendations concerning nomadic indigenous communities in Europe.142
In its Recommendation 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe, the Parliamentary
Assembly stated:‘the provisions of anyadditional protocol or convention relating
136 ILO Recommendation 104, supra n. 65 at para. 35.
137 Jowitt, Dictionary of English Law, 1st edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1959) at 279.
138 For an overview on the situations of the Travellers, see Keane, ‘International Law and the
Ethnicity of Irish Travellers’, (2005) 11 Washington and Lee Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law
Journal 43.
139 As regards Roma/Gypsy communities it is estimated that 20 to 40 percent of the Roma
population in Europe retain a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, see Liegeois and
Gheorghe, supra n. 16.
140 For an overview of the situation of the Roma, see Pogany, ‘Accomodating an Emergent
National Identity: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe’, (1999) 6 International Journal
on Minority and Group Rights 149.
141 See Gilbert, ‘Still No Place to Go: Nomadic Peoples’ Territorial Rights in Europe’, (2004/2005)
4 EuropeanYearbook on Minority Issues 141.
142 See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 563 (1969) on the
Situation of Gypsies and Other Travellers in Europe, 30 September 1969; Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers Resolution (75) 13 on the Social Situation of Nomads in Europe,
22 May 1975; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (83) 1 on
Stateless Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality, 22 February 1983; and
Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe Resolution 125 (1981) on
the Role and Responsibility of Local and Regional Authorities in Regard to the Cultural and
Social Problems of Populations of Nomadic Origin, 29 October 1981.
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to minorities should apply to non-territorial minorities’.143 In 1998, the
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance adopted a General
Policy Recommendation on ‘Combating racism and intolerance against
Roma/Gypsies’ and recommended states ‘ensure that the questions relating to
‘‘travelling’’ within a country, in particular regulations concerning residence
and town planning, are solved in a way which does not hinder the way of life
of the persons concerned’.144
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also
addressed the situation of Roma communities in its General Recommendation
27. The Committee has recommended that states ‘take measures for offering
Roma nomadic groups or Travellers camping places for their caravans, with all
necessary facilities.’145 The Committee also highlighted that states should
develop and implement ‘policies to avoid segregation of Roma communities in
housing’, and that states should ‘act against discriminatory practices by local
authorities and private owners with regard to taking up residences and access
housing, to act against local measures denying residence, and refrain from
placing Roma in camps outside populated areas that are isolated and without
access to health care and other facilities.’146 The Committee, in its 2003
Concluding Observations to the United Kingdom, pointed out that the discrimi-
nation faced by Roma/Gypsies/Travellers was notably reflected in ‘poor housing
conditions’ and the ‘lack of available camping sites’.147 Earlier, in its 1996
Concluding Observations to the United Kingdom, the Committee noted:
Special concern is also expressed for the Irish Traveller community,
whose situation affects their right to public health care and social
services under article 5(e). It is noted that the policy of designating
land for the use of Travellers has contributed to their lower standard of
living and has curtailed their freedom of movement by limiting the
places which they might inhabit.148
Other agencies have also outlined an obligation for states to provide halting
sites for nomadic groups. For example, the ILO Office was asked by the Swiss
143 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in
Europe, 2 February 1993.
144 Council of Europe European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance General Policy
Recommendation No. 3: Combating Racism and Intolerance Against Roma/Gypsies, 6 March
1998, CRI (98) 29 rev.
145 CERD, General Recomendation XXVII on Discrimination against Roma, 16 August 2000,
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 224; 8 IHRR 310 (2001) at para. 32.
146 Ibid. at para. 31.
147 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 10 December 2003, CERD/C/63/CO/
11 at para. 22.
148 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 18 March 1996, CERD/C/304/Add.9
at para. 15.
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government whether in the case of travellers, ILO Convention No.169 put states
under an‘obligation to place at their disposal land for transit purposes or certain
sites traditionally used as temporary stopping places.’149 The ILO Office pointed
out that such an obligation would flow from Article14, but highlighted that:
While the principle of the obligation is clearly established ^ namely to
safeguard the rights of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclu-
sively occupied by them for their traditional activities, with special
attention to the situation of nomadic peoples ^ the modalities of imple-
mentation are left up to each Member, subject to compliance with the
procedural obligations under the Convention, in particular consultation
of the peoples involved.150
The Office concluded that in anycase‘leeway in terms of implementation does
not, however, release a Member party to the Convention from its obligation
underArticle14.’151
Similarly, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has also
focused on the situation of Roma/Gypsies in Europe. The High Commissioner’s
report of 2000 on the situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE stated:
It must be emphasised that whether an individual is nomadic, semi-
nomadic or sedentary should, like other aspects of his or her ethnic
identity, be solely a matter of personal choice. The policies of some
OSCE participating States have at times breached this principle, either
by making a determination of a group’s fundamental lifestyle that
is inconsistent with its members’ choices or by making it virtually
impossible for individuals to pursue the lifestyle that expresses their
group identity.152
The report recommended that for those Roma who ‘maintained a nomadic
or semi-nomadic lifestyle the availability of legal and suitable parking sites
was a paramount need and precondition to the maintenance of their group
identity’.153
Clearly in Europe there is a body of law emerging which recognises a right to
encampment for nomadic communities. Even though this has been a European
development, it could have significant impact in other regions of the world, as
nomadic peoples’right to land would be based on the notion of a right to preserve
their ownway of life, including a right to halting facilities.
149 ILO Report of the Director-General, March 2001, GB.280/18 at para. 25.
150 Ibid. at para. 28.
151 Ibid.
152 OSCE, ‘Report on the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area’, 10 March 2000 at 101.
153 Ibid. at 110.
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5. Conclusion
As stated at the outset of this article, since the dawn of mankind there have been
pressures on the nomadic lifestyle. However, it seems that we have reached a
point where nomadic peoples are on the verge of extinction as a result of increas-
ing restrictions on their right to use their traditional itinerant territories.
Nomadic peoples are directly affected by economic globalisation as more and
more pressure is put on their territories as a result of mining and extraction of
natural and mineral resources. Even though nomadic peoples remain at the
margin of global capitalist development, they are directly affected by the inter-
ests from states andmultinational corporations in the natural wealth that can be
found in their lands. As this article has pointed out, generally the legal answer to
such threats remains extremely underdeveloped as nomadism is not addressed
under international law. However, this article has also highlighted that we are
witnessing a gradual, albeit slow, development towards a right for nomadic peo-
ples to use their lands and territories in a nomadic way. The establishment of
such a legal framework guaranteeing a right for nomadic peoples to perpetuate
their nomadic lifestyle is a crucial step to ensuring that nomadic peoples can
remain nomads.This article has explored the legal approach towards nomadism.
A crucial development under international human rights law is the recognition
that nomadic peoples’ identity is linked to traditions of mobility. Certainly the
most valuable contribution of the human rights discourse is the recognition of
the right for nomadic peoples to exercise their own traditional customary sys-
tems of land tenure and usage. This article has highlighted the extent to which,
under the banner of indigenous peoples’ rights, human rights law is promoting
the right for nomadic peoples to have their traditional systems of laws recog-
nised by states. This has to be seen as the best path for nomadic peoples’ future,
as it marks a recognition that they do have the right to be different and that such
a right entails their right to maintain their own perspective on the interaction
betweena people and a territory. After centuries of rejection of such rights under
international law, the recent developments that have taken place under human
rights law offer great promise. It is also worth highlighting that the recognition
of nomadic peoples’ right to exercise their own traditions would make the whole
human rights systemmore universal byaffirming that all cultures are equal and
should be treated equally. By recognising the traditions of nomadic peoples,
human rights law reflects the idea that different cultural legal systems could
co-exist in the same territory and that there should not be any antagonism
between such culturally diverse approaches to land usage.
One of the crucial aspects of this culturally sound approach resides in the fact
that human rights law does not assume that cultures are frozen in time, but can
evolve and change over time. This means that a human rights-based approach
does not assume that nomadic peoples should exercise their rights the way they
once did, but takes into consideration that their traditions could change over
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time.The critical message that the human rights approach conveys is that noma-
dic peoples maychoose to develop their nomadic lifestyle if they sowish.This is a
welcome advance for an international legal systemwhich for centuries has seen
nomadic peoples as ‘savages’ who should be forced into so-called ‘civilization’.
These developments within the legal arena also point towards another positive
development: with collaboration between different disciplines, it is no longer
possible for lawyers and judges to ignore historical, anthropological and social
factors when addressing the rights of nomadic peoples. Recent developments
clearly indicate that such collaboration is effectively working as regional courts
such as the IACtHR, or national courts such as the Supreme Court of Canada,
have received evidence based on a multidisciplinary approach. This has to be
seen as a positive step in the development of human rights law as the traditional
water-tight approach between disciplines was altering the universal and indivi-
sible advancement of human rights.
This point about universalism is central to the situation of nomadic societies.
It could seem paradoxical to address the rights of nomadic peoples as a universal
phenomenon, as nomadic societies are culturally tremendously diverse and cer-
tainly do not represent a homogenised picture. However, despite such diversity
nomadic peoples share the same concerns when it comes to their right to use
their traditional territories in a nomadic way. In this sense it seems that a
global approach would be suitable as there is a need for a universal legal frame-
work specific for nomadic peoples’ land usage. There is a need for a stronger
human rights approach to the rights of nomadic peoples, as international law is
still a system based on the superiority of the settled way of life in which nomad-
ism is regarded as something to be eradicated.
As highlighted, the rules governing territorial ownership emerged from a
veryWestern theory that land has to be ‘properly’ used and occupied to provide
title of ownership. Consequently, historically, nomadic communities have not
been regarded as sufficiently ‘civilised’ to possess rights over their territories.
The nomadic system of land use was seen as an outdated and non-rational orga-
nisation of land utilisation.Yet, overall, when evaluating the current system, it
seems clear that nomadic peoples are gaining rights through the human rights
discourse, more specifically under the banner of indigenous peoples’ rights.
However, this article has highlighted the limitations of this approach and
explored the development of a ‘nomadic lex specialis’. It is submitted that we are
witnessing the development of such a specific body of international law, a
‘nomadic lex specialis’ that provides nomadic peoples with specific entitlements
necessary to the survival of their lifestyle. The current approach seems to be
more developed under indigenous peoples’ rights, but, as was highlighted, not
all nomadic or semi-nomadic communities would qualify as ‘indigenous’. There
are some limitations for usinga channel such as the current systemof protection
for indigenous peoples as it remains underdeveloped and would not always
address nomadic peoples’ specific lifestyles. Nomadic peoples have been the
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victims of international law and accordingly there is a need to recognise their
specific claims. If indigenous peoples are often labelled as a ‘super’ minority it
could be argued that nomadic peoples constitute a ‘super indigenous minority’.
In most societies, indigenous nomadic peoples face double discrimination as
indigenous peoples or minorities and as being nomadic. Despite the gradual,
albeit slow, evolution at the international level regarding the territorial entitle-
ments of nomadic peoples, at the national level they are generally still seen as
squatters on their own lands.
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